Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Economic growth is more a function of firm size expansion in existing firms than of the creation of new firms (Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 1999) . This statement, based on international evidence, is also true for Argentina: according to official statistics, existing firms account for 83 percent of gross and 88 percent of net job creation between 2002 (Ministry of Labor, 2012 . In the same vein, considering the 1996-2011 period, the 70.3 percent increase in total employment was accompanied by an increase in average firm size from 7.5 workers to 10.1 workers.
In light of the central role of firm size in employment and economic growth, the goal of this paper is to determine whether the availability of bank credit, among other determinants, explains the variation in average firm size across industries and over time in Argentina. As long as the ability of firms to grow rests on their ability to obtain external and internal financing to take advantage of good investment opportunities, these financial aspects should be front and center in the analysis of firm size drivers. To this end, we have compiled a novel three-digit industry-level dataset spanning the 2000-2010 period with annual data.
The particularly low degree of credit expansion in Argentina underscores the significance of this country case study. As a result of chronic inflation and recurring systemic crises, financial intermediation in the Argentine banking system has been declining since the 1970s. Private credit to GDP was a mere 24 percent in 1979; currently, it is 14 percent. Business credit represents just 55 percent of private credit, with consumer loans comprising the rest. Most business loans are short-term: 77 percent have a maturity of six months or less, and only 12 percent have terms of one year or more (Central Bank, 2012) . 2 Therefore, the influence of credit (and internal financing sources) on productive decisions stands out as an appealing and little-researched investigated topic in a low-credit economy such as Argentina's.
The crisis of 2001-2002-an exogenous shock on the business sector with differential effects across industries-will be used for econometric identification purposes.
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and explains the methodological approach. Section 3 describes the database, and Section 4 discusses the econometric results. Section 5 closes with some conclusions.
Literature Review and Methodological Approach

Literature Review
A burgeoning literature aims to uncover the determinants of firm size. One of the most influential contributions in recent years is the study by Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) . This paper contributes to the empirical literature by linking financial constraints and firm size.
Research in this area faces two main empirical challenges: the observability of financial constraints (financial constraints are not directly observable by the researcher) and the potential endogeneity of the financial constraint/firm size link. Reverse causality may occur if firm size enhances the ability to tap credit markets, as emphasized in the corporate finance literature (Eckbo, 2008) .
Regarding the first issue, two empirical approaches have been applied: The first is that an
industry (not a particular firm) is financially constrained if it deviates from a frictionless degree
of financial dependence for this particular industry. The seminal paper advancing this approach is Rajan and Zingales (1998) , which takes the United States as the frictionless benchmark.
Subsequent empirical applications include, among many others, Beck et al. (2008) and Catão, Pagés, and Rosales (2009) 
. Second, a firm is financially constrained if it describes itself as such.
In this case, the essential informational input is a survey asking individual firms whether access to finance acts as a major obstacle to business growth, or whether their loan applications were 2 Recalling that Argentina has a bank-centered financial system and thus a shallow capital market, these numbers also attest to the importance of internal funds. Bebczuk (2011) finds that, in the aggregate, 64 percent of gross business investment is internally financed. The World Bank (2011), in its Enterprise Survey on about 1,000 firms, reaches a similar value (64 percent).
rejected by the banking system. Meisenzahl (2011), Angelini, and Generale (2008) and Kuntchev et al. (2012) are among the studies that take this approach. Even though the response by the firm is not directly verifiable by the research, one should expect it to be, on average, a good, firsthand proxy for financial constraints.
In terms of endogeneity bias, the industry financial dependence approach delivers a more dependable response than the self-reported financial constraint approach. After all, the financing structure in the United States is exogenous to other countries, a quality that cannot be claimed under the second approach. However, where the first approach distinctly fails in our view is in the identification of who is financially constrained. In a nutshell, the pitfall of this measure lies in the fact that financial constraints are assumed rather than observed, with the additional disadvantage that the assumptions are not especially plausible from an empirical point of view. This is particularly true when the chosen measure of financial dependence is extrapolated to study country experiences other than that of the United States.
Elaborating on the argument, our reservations about this popular index rest on three factors. The first is the doubtful characterization of the United States as the frictionless financial market. As a matter of fact, the argument does not require the U.S. financial system to be A second problem is the stability of the financial dependence index across countries and over time. Industries may vary their capital-labor mix or adopt different productive technologies in different countries in response to real or financial structural conditions. 3 Financial structure is both a technological and a managerial choice. In striving to maximize shareholder wealth, managers look for the financial structure that minimizes the overall cost of capital. Thus, the domestic cost and availability of capital will endogenously influence the mix of debt and other sources across the board, over and beyond the technological features of each industry. As for the time variation, external financing needs (defined by investment expenditures minus internally generated cash flow) may also substantially vary over the business cycle and, perhaps more importantly, cannot be constant over a company's lifetime: to meet its intertemporal financial constraint, a firm may need to tap the financial market in its initial growth stages, but eventually must generate positive net cash flows to repay its debts and compensate its shareholders.
A final and equally important caveat is that the studies focusing on industry financial dependence do not present any evidence on how private credit is actually allocated ex post or whether the allegedly constrained sectors were able to access it. Typically, in explaining industry growth, these papers interact the industry's financial dependence index with a stock measure of credit (e.g., private credit to GDP) assuming, but not checking, whether these prima facie constrained sectors managed to obtain a higher inflow of bank credit in the face of an increase in private credit deepening.
Empirical Approach
The approach taken in this study is akin to the methodology used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
Despite our objections to the empirical proxies typically used in most applications, we believe that this strategy provides a simple, not overly data-demanding, and technically sound way to address the endogeneity that plagues the link between finance and economic activity. A local financial dependence benchmark is presented to address some of the financial dependence measurement issues mentioned above. Our industry-level dataset does not contain any selfreported measure of financial constraint. This prevents us from applying the second, surveybased methodology presented earlier. In turn, the omission of actual borrowing patterns will be dealt with by way of some robustness exercises, in which the actual association between average business size and debt and internal financing will be explored.
Since employing the United States as a benchmark for industry financial dependence may cause severe distortions, in implementing Rajan and Zingales (1998) to study the Argentine case, is 3.0 in Italy, 2.6 in Japan, and 1.6 in Germany. Similar discrepancies are observed for the agriculture sector, with the ratio ranging from 1.9 in the United States to 3.7 in Germany and 10.4 in Japan.
we use a more sensitive local financial dependence benchmark. This has the added advantage of being computed not on a sample but rather on the universe of formal firms in each industry. (2000), which impairs our ability to control for other factors that might influence average firm size. The dummies are intended to rectify this deficiency. A standard and widely accepted procedure when dealing with this sort of data structure, this is in fact the same strategy followed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , among many related studies.
The procedure crucially hinges on the assumption that the credit crunch in Argentina represented an exogenous credit supply shock. There are two arguments favoring that hypothesis.
First, the crisis was the result of macroeconomic (namely, real exchange rate overvaluation) and fiscal disturbances (growing external indebtedness, assessed as unsustainable by the consensus of market players). 7 As banks were heavily exposed to government debt and dollar-denominated loans to peso-generating local borrowers, the sovereign default and the steep devaluation in 2002 brought about the technical bankruptcy of the banking system. Thus, the origin of the crisis was unrelated to any technological shock to the productive sector, although production was subsequently hit by the financial and economic collapse. A second argument is that, in principle, it can be argued that weaker firm balance sheets and the economic downturn caused a shift in credit demand. 8 But if the drop in industry leverage had been caused solely by the retraction in the demand for funding, then the strong post-crisis economic recovery would have largely 7 According to Martin Feldstein (2002) : "An overvalued fixed exchange rate (locked at one peso per dollar since 1991) and an excessive amount of foreign debt were the two proximate causes of the Argentine crisis." 8 In this regard, the outstanding credit for the sectors under study accounts for about one third of total private credit, so it is unlikely that movements in the latter are largely explained by changes in the credit demand of those sectors. To address this issue, we will adopt loan loss provisioning (as a ratio of private credit), rather than private credit to GDP, as a measure of tighter credit supply standards. 10 Loan loss provisioning is designed to absorb future expected credit losses. When banks envisage deterioration in the borrower's ability and willingness to repay, lending policies become more conservative, especially in times of financial distress and dire economic conditions. 11 Although regulatory provisioning rules exist in all countries, banks may also apply voluntary provisioning as a risk management tool. Beatty and Liao (2009) and Packer and Zhu (2012) support this hypothesis with evidence for a large sample of U.S. and Asian banks, respectively. Thus, loan loss provisioning appears to accurately track credit standards and, as a result of being determined by regulation and by internal bank decisions, is entirely independent of credit demand. This will provide a first robustness check for the baseline regression. The expected sign in this case is 9 Calvo (2010) advances the idea that some of the recent financial crises, such as the subprime crisis in the United States as well as the Argentine crisis, were credit supply-driven. Almeida et al. (2009) discuss the difficulty of establishing whether credit crunches are a consequence of supply or demand shifts, concluding, based on a careful microdata analysis, that the U.S. crisis was triggered by a contraction in the supply of loans. 10 A crisis dummy variable is another option. But since a crisis dummy may capture a number of shocks taking place at the same time on both the financial and the real fronts, the estimated coefficient would lack a clear economic interpretation. 11 For the Argentine banking system, the loan loss provisioning ratio escalated from 7.2 percent in 2000 and 10.7 percent in 2001 to a peak of 31 percent in 2002. From then on, it dropped every year to reach a value of 3.1 percent in 2010.
negative: tighter credit standards (proxied by higher loan loss provisioning) should be more harmful to those industries that are more financially dependent.
An additional adjustment in our estimation has to do with the omission of internal funding as a crucial source of financing fueling firm growth. Business saving is by far the main source of financing in Argentina (Bebczuk, 2011a) and around the world (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008; Bebczuk, 2003) . 12 With respect to Argentina, the apparent evidence of a recovery-without-credit process in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 crisis warrants the treatment of self-financing as a major driver of firm size.
There is a large body of theoretical and empirical literature proving this point beyond question. Nevertheless, internal funding is open to the same qualification as credit in terms of endogeneity concerns, as firm size can influence the capacity of businesses to generate greater cash flows. To account for this alternative to bank credit while avoiding any potential endogeneity bias, GDP growth rate will be used as a proxy for the availability of internal funds.
Cash flows are expected to be procyclical, and aggregate growth should be expected to be largely unrelated to firm size, at least in the short run. To fit this additional variable into the RajanZingales model, it must be determined whether internal funds bear any link to financial dependence. To this end, economic growth will be interacted with the difference between loans to sales in 2000 and loans to sales in each subsequent year. The expected sign is positive: the larger the fall in leverage with respect to the "frictionless" level in 2000, the more valuable the access to reinvested earnings (proxied by GDP growth) to make up for the scarcity of external financing.
13
Finally, we examine the lack of actual borrowing patterns, which are absent in the context of Rajan and Zingales (1998) . If this model is empirically correct, we should expect bank credit (and now internal funds) to display an observable link to firm size, a feature that cannot be tested directly in equation (1). To that end, we will run this modified version:
12 For more than 100 economies, and using information from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, Ayyagary, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) describe financing patterns around the world, finding that internal funds represent 67 percent of total financing needs in low-income countries, 68 percent in middle-income countries, and 60 percent in high-income countries. Bank debt contributes 17 percent, 18 percent and 21 percent in each country group, respectively. For Argentina, in the period 2001 -2009 , Bebczuk (2011a estimates from aggregate figures that internal funding covered 64 percent of those needs and bank debt a mere 5 percent. 13 Using the change in leverage vis-à-vis the 2000 benchmark rather than just the latter has the added advantage of preventing multicolinearity with the original variable of interest.
where L is the average bank debt size (loan balance divided by number of establishments) and P represents profitability (measured by sales minus wages and interest payments, divided by sales). 14 All monetary variables are measured in pesos at 2010 prices. 15 The model seeks to explain average firm size in terms of: i) financial factors, such as access to credit (the main variable of interest) and the availability of internal funding (represented by the profitability variable); 16 and ii) non-financial factors, embedded in the industry and year dummies. In particular, more credit and internal funding are expected to be engines of a larger average firm size whenever growth opportunities are constrained by the lack of financing. No effect would arise in the context of an economy with perfect capital markets à la Modigliani-Miller.
A major advantage of equation (2) is that it transparently traces the link between firm size and the actual use of financing. However, a positive loading on the debt and internal funding variables do not necessarily imply that supply-driven financial constraints are present.
Furthermore, a crucial pitfall is that a correlation between the real and the financial side does not inform causality. It may well be the other way around, as financiers-both insiders and outsiders-may be more prone to provide resources to big companies, as emphasized in the corporate finance literature.
We work with lagged explanatory variables as an elementary control for endogeneity: in addition to the technological fact that there may be a delay between credit disbursement and industry growth, it may be the case that credit granted this year bears a higher correlation to current industry and economy-wide conditions than last year's credit.
The answer is that banks may correctly anticipate future growth and thus support it via further lending. At any rate, this leading reaction defies not only anecdotal evidence but also 14 We do not have access to any balance sheet information, but only a handful of aggregate industry variables published by the national tax revenue agency. In light of this limitation, our measure of operating profitability aims to be the closest indicator of cash flow, normalized by sales, that can be computed based on available information. Since we do not have information on interest payments, we estimated them by multiplying the average loan balance at year t-1 by the average interest rate on commercial loans at year t. 15 In unreported regressions, we included other controls likely to be associated with firm size, such as the average wage (as a ratio of aggregate wage for all sectors) and exports (either in volume and through a dummy taking value 1 if the sector exports at all, or otherwise 0). These were the only relevant extra variables on which data were available. However, none of these variables displays a statistically significant coefficient. The remaining coefficients were not noticeably affected by these additional controls. 16 Even though cash flow is proxied rather than accurately measured due to data availability constraints, cash flow rather than retained earnings (equal in turn to cash flows net of dividends) is the relevant measure of internal funding. As forcefully affirmed in the financial constraints literature (Galindo and Schiantarelli, 2003) , the investment decision depends on the total internal funding at the disposal of the financially constrained firm, with the dividend payment decision being a residual variable once good investment opportunities have been acted on.
hard evidence for Argentina and other countries. For Argentina, Bebczuk and Sangiacomo (2007) found no relationship between sectoral allocation of business bank credit and current or past sectoral growth and volatility. In turn, Bebczuk et al. (2011b) that GDP growth leads credit growth. However, more research is needed to confidently rule out endogeneity. In other words, this methodology is not well-suited to address the observability and endogeneity of financial constraints, but it fills the conspicuous gap in Rajan and Zingales (1998) relating to the actual financial behavior of the industries under consideration.
Data
In order to tackle the empirical relationship between average firm size and credit in Argentina, Two data constraints must be mentioned from the outset. The first is that the list of control variables is rather short, a problem shared by a number of papers in this literature and tackled by the inclusion of time and industry dummies. The second is that, due to confidentiality clauses, no individual business information is disclosed by the relevant government entities. This is a clear limitation of the research design, making it impossible to explore, among other issues, the link between financing and other moments of the firm size distribution beyond the mean. Nonetheless, the industry-level unit of analysis is not uncommon in many studies in this field, starting with the pioneering research by Rajan and Zingales (1998) . Additionally, our dataset has the major advantage of encompassing the universe of registered firms in these industries rather than just a sample. Our usable sample contains information on about 93,000 firms and over a million workers in 2010.
19
For the activities under study, the dataset includes all formal transactions but no unregistered operations that these or other businesses may carry out. The widespread prevalence of informality in Argentina may be an important but unavoidable statistical constraint. However, this does not compromise the validity of our analysis as, when filing tax returns, businesses tend to maintain some consistency between reported sales and employment figures to make it harder for tax authorities to detect evasion and elusion accounting strategies. In turn, formal financial intermediaries lend mostly on the basis of those very accounting records.
20
Our description of the dataset and the econometric analysis presents results for the whole sample as well as separate figures for industries pertaining to the primary and the manufacturing sectors. This split is justified by the observation that the leverage (loans-to-sales ratio) of these two sectors is visibly different, both before and after the 2001-2002 financial crisis.
Unfortunately, there are no prior studies comparing the financial or productive structure of primary vis-à-vis manufacturing activities. The seminal paper by Rajan and Zingales (1998) on industry dependence on external financing focuses on the manufacturing sector, as do most subsequent contributions in this area. Furthermore, little is known about the idiosyncratic features of primary sector (as opposed to manufacturing) activities, specifically product life cycles and cash harvest periods. However, the available evidence points to the fact that the agricultural sector is highly intensive in physical capital and also displays a high total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate, two technological characteristics likely to be associated with a 19 Alternative data sources have a much narrower scope. For instance, the Enterprise Survey administered by the World Bank (www.enterprisesurveys.org) polled just 1,054 firms in its last edition in 2010, and it does not allow us to construct a panel and thus distinguish firm behavior before and after the crisis. The previous survey was conducted in 2006. Furthermore, the survey excludes primary sector activities-a core element in our analysis-and informal firms. As another option, listed firms constitute a small and hardly representative set of firms in Argentina. The extremely modest activity in Argentine primary capital markets should come as no surprise in view of the size of its banking system. As of 2011, according to the World Federation of Exchanges (www.world-exchanges.org), only 99 (1,092) domestic firms list their shares (bonds). The short time period-most of them went public in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 crisis-and the large size of most of the firms are limiting factors for a comprehensive analysis. Compounding these data constraints, the government does not properly collect and disclose updated balance sheet information on firms operating in the country, regardless of the legal (but not enforced) obligation of these firms to present annual accounting statements to the Inspección General de Justicia. 20 On the other hand, our industry-level figures may be driven by the largest firms, which are the most closely monitored by tax authorities, and thus those in which evasion is least pervasive.
larger demand for external funding. In the case of Argentina, Coremberg (2009) Some of the salient statistical features of the database can be seen in Table 1 Table 1 also confirms the low penetration of bank credit: the ratio of outstanding loans to GDP for these major productive sectors stands at 4.2 percent of GDP in 2010 (1.9 percent for the primary sector As can be seen in Table 2 , the sample includes about 93,000 establishments and 1 million workers in 2010. As the number of workers grew by 38 percent over 2000-2010 and the number 21 Mining also displays a high capital-output ratio (6.4), but TFP growth has been negative over 1990-2006. In fishing industry, TPF growth is also negative, and its capital intensity is below average. 22 For the economy as a whole, annual TFP contribution over 1990-2006 was negative (-0.5 percent).
of establishments by 21 percent, the average number of workers per establishment-one of our variables of interest-increased from 10 to 11.4 between the initial and the final year. This small average firm size is particularly evident in the primary sector (6.1 workers in 2010) as compared to manufacturing (22.7). As seen in Table 3 , average sales per establishment-the other variable of interest in our study-doubled from US$5.7 million in 2000 to US$11 million in 2010. For the latter year, the average manufacturing firm had sales 5.3 times higher than those in the primary sector, against a factor of 3.7 times in terms of average employment. This asymmetry is also reflected in average productivity (as measured by sales per worker) and average wages (wages per worker), which are 42 percent and 99 percent higher in manufacturing vis-à-vis primary activities.
In line with previous ratios, Table 4 shows that average bank debt per establishment in 2010 is US$430,000 in the primary sector and US$1.1 million in the manufacturing sector, down from US$506,000 and US$1.38 million, respectively, in 2000. In light of the limited scope of the available data, leverage is proxied by the bank debt-to-sales ratio. In this regard, Table 4 shows an apparent difference in leverage between the two sectors, both before and after the crisis of the Finally, Table 5 reports operating profits. We did not have access to accounting records, but a feasible proxy is gross sales net of total wage payroll and interest payments. 23 Operating profits are of particular relevance for the analysis, as there is abundant evidence of the dominant role of internal funding in the financing structure of Argentine firms, and thus the ability to selffinance business growth. 24 In dollar terms, average operating profits jumped from US$5 to 23 No data were available on interest payments. They were computed by multiplying the average loan interest rate on commercial loans (source: Central Bank) in year t times the outstanding loan balance in year (t-1). 24 In the Introduction we commented upon this issue on the basis of actual figures for Argentina and other economies. Corporate finance studies usually measure internal funding as net revenues plus depreciation minus dividends. Operating profits is a ballpark measure of the potential ability of firms to self-finance their asset purchases. The lack of information about dividends actually paid does not affect the results, as dividends are a variable under the firm's control. If the firm has good investment opportunities and self-financing minimizes the overall cost of capital, it will refrain from paying out dividends in order to finance those projects. Hence, what US$10 million between 2000 and 2010, but as of 2010 they were five times higher in the manufacturing sector than in the primary sector. Sales fluctuated between 88 and 97 percent for both sectors.
Econometric Results
The estimation of Equation (1) finding is the confirmation that the financial crisis and the associated credit contraction had the greatest adverse effect on the industries that were more financially dependent on the eve of the crisis.
The role of internal funds was tested by adding the proposed regressor, with supporting evidence in the sales regression (Table 8) but not in the workers regression (Table 9) , where the estimate for the whole sample (but not for the primary sector) ceases to be significant for both the financial dependence and the internal funding variables.
The estimates suggest that an economically significant effect of these financing channels is explained by differences in financial dependence. The data indicate that in 2000, financial dependence (loans to sales) was 0.37 in industries above the median financial dependence (0.10) and 0.07 in industries below the median. Now we can measure the relative effect of the decline of private credit to GDP from 15.9 percent in 2000 to 12 percent in 2010. Table 8 focuses on the fuller sales specification for the whole sample. According to our estimates, this credit crunch caused a contraction in firm sales 5.3 times larger in the highly dependent industries than in remaining industries. 25 A similar exercise implies that the higher GDP growth rate in 2010 (8.5 percent) vis-à-vis 2000 (-0.8 percent) enabled the more financially dependent industries to grow 8.7 times faster than the rest because the economic expansion provided badly needed internal resources to make up for the abrupt reduction in leverage (loans to sales declined from 0.37 in 2000 to 0.11 in 2010 for highly dependent industries, and from 0.07 to 0.04 in the other industries).
matters for business growth is the maximum volume of cash flows available for reinvestment, independently of how much is paid out ex post as dividends. 25 This figure is the ratio between the change in predicted sales in highly dependent industries due to the credit contraction (that is, predicted sales in 2010 minus predicted sales in 2000) and the same change in the remaining industries.
Tables 10 and 11 confirm the robustness of an alternative proxy for the supply-driven credit crunch. When replacing private credit to GDP with loan loss provisions in the sales regression, the coefficient for the whole sample yields the expected negative and significant estimate for both the sales and the workers regressions. Additionally, within this new specification, Tables 12 and 13 support the positive role of internal funding as a catalyst for firm size growth, when measured by both sales and workers (in the latter case, at a 10 percent confidence level).
Splitting the primary from the manufacturing sectors delivers ambiguous results. Tables 6   and 7 show that the results are significant only for the primary sector, which a priori appears to be consistent with its higher financial dependence over the entire period. Credit contraction can be expected to take a heavier toll on the primary sector than on the manufacturing sector. These results are generally maintained after including the internal funding variable in Tables 8 and 9 (although in the former the manufacturing sector coefficient is significant at 5 percent and smaller than in the manufacturing sector). When loan loss provisions substitute private credit as a measure of credit supply changes, the estimation renders similar loadings on both sectors, with and without the internal funding variable (see Tables 10 through 13 ). In sum, no solid lesson can be drawn from the distinction between the primary and the manufacturing sectors. Tables 14 and 15 . The first column of Table 12 indicates that lagged loans per establishment seem to be associated with average sales, and the same goes for operating profits. Interestingly, the credit result appears to be driven by the primary sector only. The credit coefficient is not significant for manufacturing. Also worth noting is that firm size seems to be more sensitive to internal rather than external funding:
Equation (2) estimations appear in
operating profit elasticity amounts to 0.54 for the primary sector and 0.58 for the manufacturing sector, while credit elasticity is 0.09 in the former sector. This evidence remains mostly unchanged after replacing sales by workers in Table 13 . In this case, internal finding sensitivity is twice as large in the manufacturing sector (0.32 against 0.15), and credit is only significant in the primary sector, with a coefficient of 0.07. This basic regression strongly suggests that the actual behavior of firm size and credit (as well as internal funding) supports the mechanism underlying the Rajan and Zingales (1998) model.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This indicates that the credit crunch since 2001 had a larger effect on those industries that were more dependent on credit before the crisis. In addition, the analysis uncovered a significant sensitivity of average firm size to the availability of internal funding. The results do not seem to be driven
by endogeneity bias, as tested by several econometric tests and compelling economic arguments, all supporting the supply-driven credit crunch view.
Industries in the primary sector were found to have greater financial dependence than those in the manufacturing sector. However, a battery of econometric exercises delivered fragile and ambiguous results regarding the relative sectoral sensitivity to changes in bank lending. The availability of internal funding had a positive effect on the primary but not on the manufacturing sector, suggesting that the highly financially dependent primary sector benefitted more from access to internal funding in the post-crisis period. Internal funds act as a much-needed substitute for the scarcer bank lending.
These results suggest some policy implications worthy of consideration. First, they underscore the fact that the average small firm size in Argentina is significantly explained by supply-driven financing barriers. The Inter-American Development Bank (2012) finds that small firm size is a common feature to most LAC countries. Since firm size may be associated with overall productive efficiency and labor informality, policies aimed at improving access to finance are bound to have a positive impact on long-run economic growth and social well-being.
Second, the results highlight the critical role of internal funding as an engine of firm expansion in Argentina. In an economy with a structurally low level of credit deepening, the capacity to generate cash flow is fundamental for financing firm expansion. This explains why firms were able to grow in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This finding has particular relevance for the primary sector, which led the post-crisis recovery despite having to struggle simultaneously with high financial dependence and a credit crunch. Given the demanding institutional conditions required tobring about a deeper financial system, a more fruitful and realistic policy goal that would favor expansion of firm size is preventing macroeconomic shocks that affect the level and stability of sales and the generation of larger business cash flows.
Regrettably, the lack of a rich panel database of Argentine firms precludes a more thorough analysis of firm behavior around the crisis. Further work is needed to isolate credit supply from credit demand shifts. With respect to the distinction between the primary and the manufacturing sector, our findings deliver inconclusive lessons, despite the observed differences in the degree of financial dependence. The differential business response via sales and via workers to changes in the financing environment also warrants further research. Detailed balance sheet data on productive and financial performance would help refine the analysis by adding additional controls in firm size regressions. 
